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Regulatory Aspects of National Health
Insurance Plans*
Richard A. Posner-
Congress has been inundated in recent months with proposals for
schemes of national health insurance. These proposals raise many
questions; among those that have received least attention are ones that
may be more familiar to students of public regulation than to profes-
sionals in health care. The regulatory questions have to do with manag-
ing the likely effects of national health insurance on the price of medical
services, and are the subject of this article.
INTRODUCTION
To grasp these issues, it is necessary to understand the consequences
predicted by economic theory of a sudden and substantial increase in
the volume of consumer demand for a service. In the short run, the
supply of the service, being equal to the previous and smaller demand,
will be inadequate and competition for the limited supply will either
bid up prices or lead to queues (waiting periods) or other methods of
nonprice rationing. In the long run, existing firms or new providers of
the service will expand the supply, prices will fall, and queueing and
0 The author wrote an earlier version of this article as a consultant to the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare. The views expressed are the author's, not the Depart-
ment's. The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments of Reuben A. Kessel on
an earlier draft.
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
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other nonprice rationing will disappear.' If the time required to expand
the supply to meet the new demand is long, the price and nonprice
effects of increasing demand will be more serious than if the time is
short. Should demanders for some reason lack the usual incentive of a
purchaser to economize on the purchase of a good or service, the price
effect of temporarily inadequate supply will be aggravated and the
return of price to a lower level as supply expands will be retarded.
It seems generally agreed that the skyrocketing costs of health care
in recent years in the United States can be traced in significant part to
the Medicare and, to a lesser extent, Medicaid programs, which poured
vast governmental funds into the demand side of the health care indus-
try while paying virtually no attention to conditions on the supply
side.2 The supply of medical services is difficult to expand rapidly, due
in large part to legal restrictions, adopted at the behest of the organized
medical profession, which have limited the supply of physicians. The
restrictions include stringent licensure requirements, limitations on the
provision of medical services by entrepreneurs other than physicians,
rules limiting delegation of functions by physicians to nonphysicians,
prohibition of advertising by physicians, and others.3 Such constraints
made it impossible for the industry to respond adequately to the large
increases in demand brought about by the governmental programs,
while the method by which demand was stimulated-government
agreeing to pay a large part of the medical expenses of aged and some
poor people-weakened the consumer's incentive to economize on
medical care by either limiting utilization or seeking out low-cost
providers, because money saved in this way would not be retained by
him.
I Ironically, steeply rising medical costs, although in part a legacy of
Medicare and Medicaid, have created seemingly irresistible pressure to
replicate these programs on a vast scale. It is no longer just the poor and
the'aged who have difficulty in meeting medical expenses, but most
people. The result has been a spate of bills in Congress to extend
federally supported or required health insurance to other, and usually
.larger, groups in the population.
Many considerations are relevant to an appraisal of such bills, such
as the distributive effect-has the bill a progressive or. regressive impact
1 The resulting equilibrium price, however, will be somewhat higher than before the
increase in demand, assuming a positively sloped marginal cost curve.
2 Cf. Cooper, Medical Care Outlays for Aged and Nonaged Persons, 1966-1969, 33
SOcIAL SEcuRITY BULL. 3, 11 (July, 1970).
8 See generally ASPEN SYSTEMS CoRPORATION, GROUP PRACTICE AND THE LAW: A DIGEST OF
STATE LAWS AFEaCrING Tim GROUP PmAcTIC QF MEDICINE (169). .
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on the distribution of income and wealth? Without considering these
and other questions, it is impossible to form a judgment on the ultimate
question whether any form of national health insurance is necessary
or appropriate. This article, however, is limited to a single aspect of the
national health insurance problem-the merits of current proposals in
managing the consequences, in particular steeply rising prices, that
experience under Medicare and Medicaid teaches can be expected when
the federal government enlarges the demand for health services-and
to five representative bills:4 the Long bill (catastrophic health insur-
ance), the Fulton-Broyhill bill (the American Medical Association's
"Medicredit" proposal), the Bennett bill (the Administration's pro-
posal), the Pell-Mondale bill, and the Kennedy bill.5 The provisions of
the bills will emerge in due course.
I. RYGULATION OF HEALTH CARE: THE IssuEs
Before proceeding to a detailed comparison of the regulatory provi-
sions of the bills, it will be helpful to make some threshold distinctions
among possible regulatory approaches in the health care field and to
delineate the major issues raised by each.
A fundamental distinction is that between regulation designed to
operate on the demand for health services and regulation designed
to operate on supply. An example of the former is coinsurance,
whereby the consumer of medical services is required to defray a per-
centage of his medical expenses but is insured for the remainder.
Coinsurance gives the consumer some pecuniary incentive to refrain
from making excessive demands and to seek out low-cost services. An
example of supply regulation would be a ceiling on physicians' fees.
A further distinction may be drawn on the supply side between what
one might term "static" regulation, which takes the existing supply of
medical services as given (a ceiling on physicians' fees is such a regula-
tion), and "dynamic" regulation, which seeks to stimulate expansion in
the supply of medical services in order to avert the price and nonprice
effects that occur when a supply made inadequate by a sudden increase
in demand must be rationed.
Each of these broad classes inyolives a number of specific issues and
choices. The main ones follow.
4 Thirteen bills were pending at last count. See Office of Research & Statistics, Social
Security Administration, Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, National Health Insurance
Proposals Introduced in the 92nd Congress, May, 1971 (mimeographed report).
5 S. 1376, H.R. 4960, S. 1623, S. 703, S. 3, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
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A. Regulation of Demand
1. Scope and Nature of Benefits. The broader (number of people
covered) and deeper (amount of benefits to which those covered are
entitled) the benefits provided by a health care plan, the larger will be
the plan's impact on the demand for medical services. The nature of
the benefits is also important. If an included benefit is one that most
people now buy with their private funds or private insurance, a law
requiring provision of the benefit may change the manner in which it
is provided or shift the cost to another group, but it will not necessar-
ily increase demand." At the opposite extreme is a benefit (for example,
a complete annual physical examination) not widely purchased today
with private resources. The inevitable effect of a governmental re-
quirement that it be provided is to increase the quantity of medical
services demanded.
2. Structure of Benefits. National health insurance plans, like
their private counterparts, invariably exclude (wholly or partially) some
forms of health service from their coverage, such as nursing home care
rendered other than in a "skilled" nursing home. Such a pattern of
differential coverage creates an incentive to substitute a covered for an
excluded service. One of the problems in the administration of Medi-
care, for example, has been that people requiring custodial treatment
less extensive than that provided in skilled nursing homes have none-
theless been placed in such facilities because Medicare would not re-
imburse their expenses in less elaborate (and less costly) facilities.7
Another example is the substitution of more expensive hospital care
for less expensive ambulatory care by individuals whose hospital in-
surance is more extensive than their nonhospital medical insurance,
the usual pattern in private health insurance.8
3. Incentives of the Consumer to Economize. When a service is sub-
sidized, the beneficiary's incentive to economize on its use, both by
choice of a low-cost supplier and by avoidance of unnecessary consump-
tion, is weakened. One method of dealing with this problem is to make
the beneficiary pay part of the cost of the service, in the form either of
a deductible (for example, the patient must pay for the first two days in
6 However, by freeing up consumers' resources to spend on other products, a law pro-
viding a medical benefit may indirectly increase the demand for health services, since some
of the freed-up resources may be used to purchase additional such services.
7 See, e.g., Hearings on Medicare and Medicaid Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 197 (1970) (testimony of William C. White, Jr., Vice-President,
Prudential Insurance Company) [hereinafter cited as Medicare-Medicaid Hearings].
8 See, e.g., H. SoMEas & A. SOMERS, DocTORs, PATIENTS, AND HEALTH INSURANCE: THE
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCING OF MEDICAL CAR 176-77 (1961).
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the hospital or the first one hundred dollars of physicians' bills) or of
coinsurance (the patient must pay a specified dollar portion, or more
commonly a percentage, of any medical bill). The incentive effects of
the devices differ. The deductible discourages the individual from
utilizing a medical service only in the first instance; once he has done
so and used up the deductible, he has no further incentive to econo-
mize. Both these features of the deductible are undesirable, although
the first less obviously so. (By encouraging postponement of medical
attention-especially, one may speculate, preventive attention-a
deductible may in the long run increase a plan's expense.) Coinsurance
is better, but it is no panacea; the consumer's incentive to economize
on the purchase of a service remains weak because he pays only a small
fraction of its cost.
The likely effectiveness of economic inducements on the consumer
of medical services is a matter of some debate. Such a consumer may
have less information on which to base an intelligent choice than other
consumers, due partly to the technical and uncertain character of the
service, partly to the relative infrequency with which particular medical
services are purchased by individuals, and partly to lack of competition
among the providers. It does not follow that proper incentives would
not help, but it would seem that involving other, more knowledgeable
entities-such as health insurance companies, unions, and employers-
in the purchase of medical services could be an important economizing
step. To be sure, the record of such entities in controlling the cost and
utilization of medical services is a mixed one. Health insurance com-
panies, including the Blue Cross and Blue Shield associations, appear
to have a generally poor record in claims control,9 while employers and
unions have been pioneers in encouraging promising new forms of
health care, such as prepaid group practice. The apparent failure of the
insurance industry could reflect several factors: organized medicine
dominates Blue Cross and Blue Shield, which, in part because of tax
advantages, write a substantial portion of the country's health insur-
ance;' 0 many health insurers, including Blue Cross and Blue Shield,
because they are nonprofit entities, lack normal business incentives to
9 This was conceded by industry representatives in their testimony before the Senate
Finance Committee. See Medicare-Medicaid Hearings, supra note 7. See also E. KAMz,
PRICING POLICY AND Cosr BEHAVIOR IN THE HOSPITAL INDUSTRY (1968). The Secretary of
HEW has promised a bill regulating the health insurance industry in order to improve
its performance in controlling costs, Hearings on National Health Insurance Before the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 97 (1971) [hereinafter cited as National
Health Insurance Hearings], but at this writing the bill has not yet been introduced.
10 See, e.g., H. Somas & A. SoMmts, supra note 8, at 296-97, 319, 324.
1971]
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perform efficiently; and the costs of monitoring health care, as will
appear, are probably high.
B. "Static" Regulation of Supply
1. Pricing Systems. One way to control the costs of health care is to
encourage or compel adoption of a pricing system that gives the pro-
vider an incentive to economize on services rendered. An example is the
pricing system used by prepaid group practice plans. The enrollee pays
a single annual charge ("capitation" fee) entitling him to comprehen-
sive health service. Because the provider who charges on a capitation
fee basis receives no additional payment for individual services, he has
no incentive to perform unnecessary ones; the conflict of interest inher-
ent in fee-for-service pricing, whereby the physician who recommends
a treatment profits from rendering it, is eliminated. Professor Kessel
has suggested that capitation fee pricing also enables the purchase of
medical services at lower prices than fee-for-service pricing. 1 But cap-
itation fee pricing is not without problems. If, as critics of fee-for-service
pricing contend, that method encourages excessive provision of medical
services, it would seem that capitation fee pricing must encourage
inadequate provision of services. Although there is a check built into
the capitation system in that skimping on medical attention may
increase the long-run cost to the plan by necessitating more costly
treatment later, not all necessary or appropriate medical procedures
avoid larger future medical expenses (discounted to present value) than
they save. (Sometimes the patient, if not treated, will simply die.) One
can reply that it is cynical to assume that providers paid by capitation
fees make such calculations, but perhaps it is no more cynical than to
assume that fee-for-service practitioners perform unnecessary proce-
dures, Which of course usually involve some danger to the patient.
2. Utilization Review. In principle, it is possible to control utilza-
tion directly, by disallowing the claims of providers who in the judg-
ment of some appropriate body have rendered unnecessary services. In
practice, however, the result is likely to be different, if experience in
the public utility and common carrier industries is any guide. For
reasons that will -be discussed later, public utility (or its equivalent,
common carrier) regulation creates incentives to incur unnecessary
expenditures. Regulatory agencies are therefore routinely empowered
to disallow such expenditures in reviewing the rates of regulated firms.
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However, in the, vast majority of cases; the exercise of this power is
perfunctory and ineffectual.12 In view of the complexity and detail of
business operations and the importance of giving management broad
decision-making latitude if it is to be held accountable for business
performance, even the most conscientious regulators are reluctant to
second-guess routine managerial decisions.
There is scant reason to be optimistic about the results of extending
such regulation to the health care field. The decisions are no less com-
plex, and perhaps more so. And there is a long tradition of excluding
lay participation in medical decision making. In these circumstances
it is no surprise that private health insurance companies have done little
to monitor claims. Nor is it surprising that utilization review, under
both the Medicare program and current national health insurance pro-
posals, is entrusted to physician panels.13 Although such delegation may
be inevitable, it does not augur well for a vigorous and effective pro-
gram of cost control. Physicians are likely to be as reluctant as regula-
tors, if for somewhat different reasons, to second-guess (except in ex-
treme cases) the decisions of practitioners-their professional colleagues
-- especially when, as considerations of cost and practicality may dic-
tate, the members of the utilization review panel are drawn from the
same hospital or community as the reviewees. 14
3. Construction Controls. A good deal of the concern about sup-
posed inefficiency in health care services focuses on hospital expansion
and improvement, much of which is alleged to be unnecessary. An
ostensibly similar concern about overbuilding is the expressed basis for
provisions, commonly found in regulatory statutes, requiring that the
permission of the regulatory agency be obtained for any new construc-
tion or extension of plant. These provisions are a possible model for
similar controls over hospitals, nursing homes, and other health care
institutions, but again the model is an inauspicious one. Construction
controls in the regulated industries have too often been used to prevent
the entry of new competitors or to limit the competition of existing ones.
Even when administered in perfectly good faith, such controls are a
12 For support of these and other assertions made in this article concerning public
utility regulation, see Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548
(1969).
13 For the Medicare provisions governing utilization review, see 42 U.S.C. § 195x(k)
(1970).
14 Most utilization review committees under Medicare are in-house committees. See
R. ScHUME9, HosPrrAL UTUMsATON REvmw AND MEDmcAIE: A SURVEY 36 (Office of Research
& Statistics, Social Security Administration, Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare Staff
Paper No. 8, 1971).
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source of delay and expense in meeting new increments of demand.' 5
Since the slow pace at which the supply of medical services responds to
increases in demand appears to be at the heart of the health care crisis,
one fairly shudders at the prospect of borrowing from the regulated in-
dustries a device so prone to be misused to retard needed expansions of
services.
4. Price Regulation. In a number of industries-mainly the energy,
transportation, and communications fields-one finds direct and com-
prehensive controls over pricing, administered by regulatory commis-
sions. The theory of public utility regulation (as this form of regulation
is known) is that in markets characterized by pronounced elements of
"natural monopoly"--markets in which competition cannot be expected
to limit price to cost-government can improve performance by under-
taking to ascertain the sellers' costs and prohibiting the sellers from
charging prices higher than are necessary to recover those costs (includ-
ing a reasonable return on invested capital). Superficially, extension of
public utility regulation to the health care field appears to have
merit.16 The market for health services is not adequately competitive,
if only because of the extensive monopolistic restraints that organized
medicine has been able to impose.'7 The price of many health services,
therefore, probably exceeds a reasonable estimate of their cost by a
wide margin. Health care meets another traditional requirement for
imposing public utility regulation. It is a fundamental, "infrastructure"
service-a necessity rather than a luxury good. Furthermore, since high
price is the focus of public concern with health care, one may wonder
why that problem should not be met head-on.
The argument for extending the public utility type of controls over
price to health care should be resisted, however. It both exaggerates the
success of those controls in their traditional settings and ignores the
differences between those settings and the health care field.
An increasingly critical literature on public utility regulation empha-
sizes three points:
(1) In order to fix a price that neither starves the industry for capital
nor generates monopoly profits, the regulatory agency must be able to
15 See Gerwig, Natural Gas Production: A Study of Costs of Regulation, 5 J. LAw &
ECoN. 69 (1962).
16 Priest, Possible Adaptation of Public Utility Concepts in the Health "Care Field, 35
'LAWv& CoNTEMP. PROB. 839 (1970), advocates such an extension. A discussion of earlier
proposals and of limited attempts by states to regulate hospital prices may be found in
'A. SOMERS, HOSPrrAL'REGULATION: THE DILEMirA OF PUBLIC PoLIcY 2-6, 166-70 (1969).
17 See Kessel, supra note 11; Kessel, Price Discrimination in Medicine, 1 J. LAw &
E oN. 20 (1958).
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determine the costs of the regulated firms with reasonable accuracy. The
agency cannot simply accept the firm's own determinations; it must
make its own. But attempts to determine proper depreciation rates and
reserves, optimum leverage, cost of equity capital, allocation of joint
costs, and many other cost and financial items encounter intractable
problems of cost accounting and investment theory. Furthermore, as
will appear, it may be erroneous to assume that the regulatory agency
always, or often, actually wants to eliminate monopoly pricing. Once
these considerations are understood, it comes as no surprise that em-
pirical investigations have found no significant impact of regulation on
price.' This finding is balanced, although not offset, by the Pyrrhic
victories of regulation, of which a recent example is the shortage in
natural gas induced by the too-low price ceiling imposed by the Federal
Power Commission in the early 1960s.19
(2) Price regulation that is not entirely ineffectual distorts the incen-
tives of the regulated firm. A firm can minimize the impact of regula-
tion on its profits in many ways, such as diversification in order to
complicate and thereby thwart regulatory determination of its costs,
the substitution of capital for other inputs (the cost of equity capital
being less susceptible of effective regulatory determination than other
costs), and expenditures designed to increase the prestige or perquisites
of the firm or its executives-a type of profit taking not subject to effec-
tive regulatory control. The result of such adaptive responses to regula-
tion is frequently higher costs than the firm would have incurred with-
out regulation, a tendency aggravated by the cost-plus character of
public utility price setting.
(3) Despite the nominally nonpartisan and independent character
of most regulatory agencies, public utility regulation is in fact a political
process. It has proved surprisingly malleable by interest groups; and the
most durable, unified, concerned, and effective interest group is often
the regulated industry itself.20 The "capture" of regulation by the
regulatees has been cited frequently in a variety of contexts. Such
agencies as the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Interstate Commerce
Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission have been
characterized persuasively as agencies for the effectuation of cartel pric-
18 Moore, The Effectiveness of Regulation of Electric Utility Prices, 36 S. Econ. J. 365
(1970); Stigler & Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J.
LAw & ECON. 1 (1962).
19 See MacAvoy, The Regulation-Induced Shortage of Natural Gas, 14 J. LAw & EcoN.
167 (1971).
20 A recent and penetrating statement of the interest group theory of regulation is
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MANAGEMENT Sem. 3 (1971).
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ing in :the industries within their jurisdictions.21 The -dominant inter-
est group-need not be the regulated industry, however; it may comprise
powerful customers or rivals. So common, indeed, is the manipulation
of regulatory rate structures to confer special benefits on particular
classes of customers that taxation-cum-subsidization must be considered
a major function in fact of the regulatory process. 22 Since the preserva-
tion of rate structures containing substantial subsidy elements requires
that'the firms providing the service be assured a monopoly in the high-
price markets in which they recoup their losses on services furnished
on a subsidized basis, taxation by regulation aggravates the problem of
monopoly-the solution of which is the formal goal of public utility
regulation.
Without more, one might hesitate to counsel the extension of public
utility regulation; but there are additional, special considerations that
argue against its extension to the health care field:
(1) The endeavor to fix appropriate rates for physicians' services
would founder on several difficulties less acutely present in the tradi-
tional public utility and common carrier industries. The first is product
specification. Unless the good or service involved in regulation is speci-
fied with fair precision, the regulated firm can substitute a less costly
service for the one' whose costs were used by the regulatory agency in
arriving at a compensatory rate. Physicians' services are even more
differentiated and variable than the usual products of regulated firms,
such as electrical energy or transportation of freight. Both the range of
different services provided by physicians and the range of skill and care
with which all but the most routine medical services can be performed
are very large.
Furthermore, the attempt to determine a reasonable price for each
medical service would encounter grave difficulty. A physician does not
purchase inputs in the market and fashion them into a product or
service as a steel mill or railroad does. If he did, the cost of his inputs
could be' added together to provide a first approximation of the cost of
the finished pr6duct (although, as mentioned, the equity capital input
would be difficult to cost). The vital inputs in physicians' services are
experience, training, and native skill and judgment; all are difficult to
measure. Measurement of the training input, for example, seems rela-
tively straightforward-if one -ignores the fact that the cost to the
physician of his medical training includes not only tuition and other
21 In addition to various studies cited in Posner, supra note 12, see Baxter, NYSE Fixed
'Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public, 22 STAN. L. REv. 675 (1970).
22 See Pdsuam, Taxation by Regulation, 2 Bru='J. EcoN.'& MAiAcEmENT Smi. 22 (1971).
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direct expenses but also opportunity costs. The latter consist of the in-
come he could have obtained, during the period of his medical training,
had he chosen another occupation, together with the interest on that
forgone income computed at an appropriate rate.
(2) The valuation problem is less acute in the case of institutional
health care, but there is an even more serious problem. Most hospitals
operate at a deficit. The complaint about hospitals is not that they make
excessive profits but that they have excessive costs due to imprudent
expansion, investment in unnecessary but prestigious facilities and
equipment, lack of profit incentives, poor management practices, and
other forms of inefficiency.23 Far from being designed or equipped to
cope with problems of this kind, public utility regulation, as mentioned,
aggravates any latent tendencies to inefficiency in regulated firms.
(3) Organized medicine has repeatedly demonstrated its political
power. Almost uniformly successful in its efforts to control public
regulation of the health care industry and shape it to its own ends, it
has also succeeded regularly in defeating or emasculating legislative
efforts to reduce its privileges. Even organized medicine cannot expect
to win every legislative battle, but it is in the nature of powerful inter-
est groups that they can outlast surges of popular concern or indigna-
tion that may succeed momentarily in procuring adverse legislation.
That is why the eventual capture of regulatory programs by the rega-
lated industries is so common a phenomenon. On the basis of its past
success, one can predict that organized medicine would be in a strong
position ultimately to dominate any scheme of price regulation imposed
on it.
(4) So nearly complete has been the domination of state regulation
of health care by organized medicine that a scheme of price regulation,
to have any chance of success, would have to be federally administered.
Yet the obstacles to effective federal regulation of so dispersed an indus-
try are formidable indeed. The United States contains seven thousand
hospitals, thousands of other health care institutions, and more than
three hundred thousand physicians, not to mention the great number
of other health professionals. With one notable recent exception, the
federal government has apparently never attempted to administer so
extensive a program of public utility controls as would be required in
the health care industry. The typical industry subject to federal public
utility regulation is one that has only a few firms, or at most a few major
28 See E. KArrz, supra note 9; cf. Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and
the Market for Health ,Services, 35 LAw 9: CoNTEMia. PROB. 716, 752 & nn. 98-99 (1970);
Newhouse, Toward a Theory of Nonprofit Institutions: An Economic Model of a Hospital,
60 AM FAN. Rv. 64, 69-70 (1970).
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firms. The exception is the effort of the Federal Power Commission,
beginning in the late 1950s, to regulate the prices charged by natural
gas producers, of which there are several thousand. That effort is now
widely regarded as an expensive and fairly complete failure despite
diligent efforts by the Commission's skilled staff to adapt traditional
public utility firm-by-firm methods to the exigencies of the situation,
as by fixing prices on an areawide rather than individual firm basis.2 4
(5) Even if all of the foregoing problems could be overcome, one
could not be confident that public utility regulation would prove to be
more than a minor palliative to the crisis in health care. At best, such
regulation would prevent profiteering; but health care profiteering is
only a symptom of the underlying malaise. The malaise itself is the
structure of restrictions noted at the outset of this article, and possibly
other factors, that make the supply of medical services respond very
slowly to the sharp increase in demand generated by national health
insurance programs. The inadequacy of supply would not be cured, or
even treated, by a ceiling on prices. Queues of various sorts would re-
place price increases as the method of rationing the short supply among
demanders-hardly a durable or satisfactory solution.
C. "Dynamic" Regulation of Supply
If restrictions on the supply of medical services are the source of the
problem, the solution seems obvious: do away with them. A frontal
attack may, however, be politically infeasible. This is suggested by the
fact that none of the pending bills mounts such an attack. All prefer
oblique approaches.
1. National Licensing. An example of an oblique approach is vesting
the federal government with part, at least, of the power now held by
the states to license physicians and certify health care facilities. Two
contradictory goals appear to inform this approach. The first is to make
the supply of physicians more fluid by eliminating any barrier to geo-
graphical mobility that may be thought to inhere in the power of the
states to refuse to recognize licensure by another state as sufficient
qualification for practice. The second is to upgrade health care in
areas (such as nursing home care) in which state supervision is be-
lieved to be lax. The contradiction lies in the fact that raising the stan-
dard of health care increases its cost and thus tends to offset the favorable
effects on supply of enabling physicians to move more easily to areas
of shortage. The tendency of national legislation to set a higher mini-
24 See Kitch, Regulation of the Field Market for Natural Gas by the Federal Power
Commission, 11 J. L4V &. EcoN. 243 (1968); MacAvoy, The Effectiveness of the Federal
Power Commission, 1 BEmIa J. EcoN. & MANAGEMENT Sc. 271, 500 (1970); MacAvoy, supra
note 19.
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mum standard than that of many states is illustrated by the Medicare
standards relating to nursing homes. 25 A further danger in national
licensing is that it offers a tempting target to organized medicine, which,
if it secured control of a single nationwide licensing process, might
dominate the industry even more completely than it does today.
2. Competition. One way of eroding the restraints that inhibit
expansion of the supply of medical services is by creating competing
alternatives26 to existing providers that would not be hampered by
the traditional restrictions. If the new competitors proved more efficient
by virtue of their freedom from those restrictions (on advertising, lay
control, pricing methods, delegation to nonphysicians, and the like),
the traditional providers would have a competitive incentive to bring
about the elimination of the restrictions across the board. Yet by avoid-
ing a direct attack on restrictions, the approach of fostering competitive
alternatives may tend to blunt the thrust of political opposition. It
has the further advantage of substituting an experimental for a purely
analytic approach.2 7 If existing restrictions are in fact unwarranted, this
would be reflected in the rapid growth of the competitive alternatives;
if the alternatives do not thrive, that would be evidence that the restric-
tions were less important or more meritorious than at present appears,
and a firm basis will have been laid for redirecting remedial action.
3. Subsidization. It is possible to expand the supply of medical ser-
vices by providing federal funds for medical training, research, facilities,
equipment, or any other perceived bottlenecks. Subsidization should be
viewed, however, primarily as a backstop, to be brought into play only
if the competitive approach last described fails. Subsidies would increase
the cost of any health plan to the United States Treasury, whereas
expansion of supply through fostering competitive alternatives would
be financed by private capital. The experimental feature of the com-
petitive approach is missing, too; heavily subsidized techniques for
relieving the health care crisis would flourish, even if inefficient, if the
subsidy were large enough. And like public utility regulation, subsidiza-
tion is highly subject to political manipulation. Experience in the mari-
time, agriculture, and other heavily subsidized industries indicates that
federal subsidy programs are often inefficient and inequitable.28
25 See note 7 supra.
26 An example is the "Health Maintenance Organization" of the Bennett bill, discussed
in the next section of this article.
27 On the difficulty of analytically resolving basic issues in optimizing health care, such
as the relative merits of capitation fees and fees for individual services, see, for example,
H. KLAXMAN, THE ECONOMICS oF HEALTr 126-31 (1965).
28 See, e.g., Stigler, Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution, 13 J. LAw & EcoN. 1
(1970).
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- 4. Educational Restrictions. Unfortunately, none of the bills deals
adequately with the most important cause of inelasticity of medical
services supply: the requirement that physicians be graduates of an
approved medical school.29 Until this requirement is rescinded or
medical education radically altered, there is little reason for optimism
that the supply of medical services can be expanded to keep pace with
large increases in demand.
D. Politics and Administrative Discretion
The dislocating effect of political pressure on governmental programs
designed to achieve efficient results has been alluded to previously.
In light of the demonstrated political "clout" of organized medicine,
the issue warrants elaboration. One may speculate that, in general, the
role of political influence is minimized when the regulating statute is
largely self-executing, or at least can be completely executed within a
reasonably short period, and maximized when the statute vests broad
discretion in the enforcing agency and envisages continuing and com-
prehensive supervision of the industry. The larger the administrator's
latitude in implementing the statute and the longer the expected period
of regulatory control, the greater is the likelihood that the industry will
be able to undo the effects of the initial legislative action imposing
regulation. It can bring pressure to bear on a new front-the administer.
ing agency. And it can bide its time until the impulse behind the legis-
lation has spent itself. The regulatory approaches discussed previously
can be arrayed on a spectrum defined by these considerations. One
extreme is public utility regulation, an indefinitely continuing process
in which all crucial decisions are made by the agency. The competitive
alternatives approach is the other extreme, for once the organizations
enabled by the legislation have been formed there is no further role
for an administrative agency to play.
II. A COMPARISON OF THE BILLS
A. Regulation of Demand
1. The Long Bill. The benefits provided in the Long bilP0 are
limited to catastrophic illnesses suffered by people under the age of
sixty-five. This is rather narrow coverage. The additional dollars
pumped into the demand side of the health industry would be relatively
29 See generally Kessel, Higher Education and the Nation's Health: A Review of the
Carnegie COmmission Report on Medical Education, forthcoming in the April, 1972 issue
of The Journal of Law and Economics.
80 S; 1376, 924 Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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few, although not trivial. The Senate Finance Committee has estimated
the first-year cost of the program to be $2.5 billion, 1 compared with
total expenditures on health care in the United States in 1970 of more
than $67 billion. 2 In estimating the impact of the proposal it is impor-
tant to note that catastrophic illnesses suffered by nonaged persons are
probably less likely to go untreated than other illnesses, so that much
of the expenditure under the proposal would represent a transfer pay-
ment from taxpayers to the families of victims of catastrophic illness
rather than the purchase of medical services that but for the new pro-
gram would not have been demanded.
All of the benefits under the program are subject to coinsurance,
although two different methods of coinsurance are employed and their
incentive effects differ. For hospital and other institutional care, the
beneficiary is required to pay a flat amount daily ($7.50 or $15.00, de-
pending on the type of institution) toward the institution's bill. This
gives him some incentive to shorten his stay but none to choose a lower-
priced rather than a higher-priced institution. In contrast, he is required
to pay twenty percent of any physician's fee, a method calculated to
induce him both to economize on visits to the doctor and to select a
lower-priced rather than a higher-priced practitioner. This is much to
be preferred to the flat rate as a method of avoiding unwarranted de-
mands for free medical service. Furthermore, unless the flat rates in the
Long bill have been carefully synchronized with the percentage co-
insurance for doctors' fees, the bill may create an incentive to substitute
institutional for ambulatory care regardless of relative efficiency in the
particular instance, since the flat rates appear to be low. Flat rates seem
a bad idea in a statute in any event, since they can quickly be made
obsolete by inflation.
2. The Fulton-Broyhill Bill. In the Fulton-Broyhill bill, 8 taxpayers
are given credits against their federal income tax liability (and those
too poor to pay income tax are given vouchers) for the purchase of
approved health insurance policies. The bill contemplates a larger
injection of federal funds on the demand side of the health industry
than does the Long bill-more than $10 billion. 4 And since, as in
S1 National Health Insurance Hearings, supra note 9, at 279 (excerpt from SENATE
Comm. oN FNANcE, REPORT ON THE SOcAL SECumTY A mENDmETrs oF 1970. S. REP_ No.
91-1431, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)).
82 Id. at 1.
33 H.R. 4960, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
34 The nominal cost estimated by its sponsors is $14.5 billion per year. National Health
Insurance Hearings, supra note 9, at 222. But since the progiam would replace Medicaid,
the actual increment of new demand would be less.
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Medicare, benefits would not be limited to catastrophic illness, enact-
ment of the Fulton-Broyhill bill would result in a substantial spurt in
the demand for medical services.
The coinsurance provisions of this bill are not attractive from an
economizing standpoint. There is no coinsurance of hospital or other
institutional inpatient care. Although there is a nominal coinsurance
rate of twenty percent for physicians' services and for laboratory and
X-ray services, in each case the maximum coinsurance is one hundred
dollars per year; the rate thus drops to zero for the remainder of any
year in which a family has already received five hundred dollars worth
of either kind of treatment. The combination of coinsurance of physi-
cians' fees with the absence of any coinsurance of hospital inpatient care
perpetuates the incentive built into existing private health insurance
plans to substitute institutional for ambulatory care regardless of
efficiency.
3. The Bennett Bill. The benefits provision of the Bennett bill3" is
in two parts: almost all employers are required to provide comprehen-
sive health insurance for their employees and the employees' families,
and the federal government insures the poor against illness much as
the aged are insured by Medicare. Nearly the entire population of the
country would be covered,36 and the benefits would be quite broad.
Enactment of the bill would increase the demand for medical services
significantly-to the extent of $6.2 to $8.2 billion a year.3 However,
most services provided under the bill, except those rendered to the very
poor, are subject to coinsurance, usually at the rate of twenty-five per-
cent. The coinsurance provisions of the Bennett bill are superior as
economizing measures to those of either of the bills discussed previously,
since coinsurance is determined on a percentage rather than a flat-rate
basis and since the rate of coinsurance is the same for institutional and
for ambulatory care. As in the Fulton-Broyhill bill, there is a ceiling
on coinsurance, but it is quite high (five thousand dollars). More ques-
tionably, the bill subjects the principal covered services to deductibles.
The Bennett bill contains two additional economizing features. First,
health care for the working population is to be financed by employers
to the extent of at least seventy-five percent of its cost. Much of this may
be shifted back in one way or another to employees; still, employers
would have a pecuniary incentive to shop around until they found plans
35 S. 1623, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
36 The elderly would remain subject to Medicare. Anyone not old, not poor, and not
employed_(or self-employed) would be permitted to join plans formed under the bill..
37 National Health Insurance Hearings, supra note 9, at 84 (testimony of HEW Secre-
tary Elliot Richardson).
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that provided the required benefits at the lowest cost to themselves and
their employees. The drive for profits is thus harnessed to provide a
force for efficiency and economy in the provision of covered services.
Second, the provision of benefits is deferred until July 1, 1973, pre-
sumably to enable a reorganization of the supply side of the industry
to meet the new demands created by the bill. The period is too short
and in any event should be measured from the date the bill is enacted.
4. The Pell-Mondale Bill. The Pell-Mondale bill38 is similar to the
Bennett bill in its likely effect on the demand for medical services. It
requires employers to provide comprehensive health benefits to em-
ployees. It excludes the poor, but unlike the Bennett bill it would not
preempt Medicaid. In one important respect, the Pell-Mondale bill is
broader in scope than the Bennett bill-it embraces drugs. Like the
latter bill, the Pell-Mondale bill would significantly increase the de-
mand for medical services. It lacks coinsurance, an important econo-
mizing feature of the Bennett bill, and it contains a detailed specification
of covered services (one of which is an annual checkup for everybody).
5. The Kennedy Bill. Among the bills considered, the Kennedy
bill 9 provides the most extensive benefits; it also lacks the economizing
features built into some of the other plans. There is no coinsurance.
Employers are not involved in the selection of providers of health ser-
vices. There is, to be sure, a slightly longer postponement of benefits
from the likely date of enactment (to July of the following year); still,
on balance, the bill would bring about a greater increase in the demand
for medical services, and place greater pressure on price, than any of the
others.
B. Regulation of Supply
1. The Long Bill. The Long bil 40 incorporates by reference the stan-
dards and procedures employed in the Medicare program to regulate
the supply of covered services. These Medicare regulations41 fall into
two broad classes: those governing who may provide services under the
program and those governing reimbursement of authorized providers
for covered services rendered. The regulation of providers is largely pro
forma. Any hospital accredited by the hospital industry's trade associa-
tion is automatically entitled to provide Medicare services; all licensed
physicians are authorized to provide such services in the states in which
38 S. 703, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
39 S. 3, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
40 S. 1376, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
41 Sec 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395u, 1395x (1970).
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they are licensed. The requifements for extended cire facilities and
certain other providers are somewhat stiffer, but their administration
has been criticized as lax and ineffectual. 42
Reimbursement of providers of Medicare services is handled by pri-
vate entities-Blue Cross and Blue Shield and, to a lesser extent, private
insurance companies. These intermediaries between the provider of
services and the government, which pays for them, are nominated, and
often controlled, by hospitals and physicians. Whether for this reason,
or because the statutory language governing standards of reimburse-
ment is loose, or, most plausibly, because the intermediaries have been
given no financial incentive to minimize the costs of the Medicare pro-
gram to the government, the control exercised by the intermediaries
over either the price or the utilization of physician and hospital services
by Medicare beneficiaries has, by all accounts, been minimal. The gov-
ernment, in turn, has exercised little control over the intermediaries.
The result has been recurrent waste and extravagance, sometimes bor-
dering on outright fraud.43
The failure of these controls is attributed by the Social Security Ad-
ministration, which administers Medicare, to a combination of inex-
perience and poor legislative drafting. There is some truth in this; and
efforts to repair the deficiencies in the existing Medicare control system
are under way.44 But the structure of regulation is not a promising one.
The first layer of regulation, private intermediaries, because of their
relationship to health care providers and because of the way in which
they are compensated (reimbursement for their out-of-pocket costs with
no allowance for profit), have little incentive to exercise stringent cost
and utilization control. The second layer of regulation, the Social Secu-
rity Administration, lacks, and is unlikely ever to acquire, the resources
that would be necessary to supervise effectively the millions of claims
submitted under the program every year.
In sum, the Medicare controls over the provision of health service
have proved weak and are likely never to be strong. Carried over into a
new area of service-the treatment of catastrophic illness suffered by
42 See SENATE ComM. ON FINANCE, 91st CONG., IST SEss., MEDicARE AND MDCAmI: PnoB-
ms IssuEs, AND ALTERNATiVES 91-96 (Comm. Print 1970).
43 See id., particularly page 116, a ringing indictment largely concurred in by HEW
(see Medicare-Medicaid Hearings, supra note 7, at pt. 1, App. B).
-44 See House -Com-ma. OR WXYS & MFAS, REPORT ON H.R. 1, SocrAL SEcURITY AmEND-
MENTS OF 1971, H.R. REP. No. 92-251, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971). Many of the suggested
reforms (summarized id. at 17-23), however, are either marginal or dubious (including
construction and pricing controls akiAi to those discussed in part II of this article).
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people under the age of sixty-five-they are unlikely to prove markedly
effective. They are in any event addressed only to the problems of ex-
cessive utilization and exorbitant pricing of health services and do not
begin to deal with the fundamental conditions, such as scarcity of phy-
sicians, that make the supply of health services unresponsive within a
reasonable time period to major increases in demand.
2. The Fulton-Broyhill Bill. The Fulton-Broyhill bill45 contem-
plates no federal regulation of the provision of health services. States
are free to regulate health insurance furnished in accordance with the
requirements of the bill as they regulate other private health insurance
today. The omission of any provision dealing with the supply of medical
services from a plan that would greatly increase the demand for such
services may appear to defy rationalization. But since the plan in effect
merely gives people more money with which to buy private health in-
surance, there is a certain plausibility to leaving unchanged the existing
system of regulating such insurance. And since the credit provided by
the plan is partial only (except for the poor), individuals have an incen-
tive to shop around among the various private insurers. The past per-
formance of the health insurance industry, however, reduces one's
confidence that competition among the insurers could be depended
on to reduce waste and extravagance to manageable proportions. The
failure to deal separately with suppliers of insurance to those who pay
nothing, and who therefore have no incentive to seek out the low-cost
supplier, is another weakness of the plan. An even more serious defi-
ciency is its failure to provide for any form of dynamic regulation-
regulation designed to augment the supply of health services. Such
a failure seems critical in a plan that would markedly increase the
demand for medical services.
8. The Bennett Bill. Although the Bennett bill4" provides for essen-
tially no control over the administration of the required employer
plans, the omission may perhaps be justified by the employer's incentive
to shop around for the least costly plan. Employers may be more knowl-
edgeable and effective shoppers than the individual consumer of health
services. And the employer is not limited to choosing among insurance
company plans but may deal directly with providers.47 One questionable
feature of the Bennett plan is that insurance carriers are authorized to
45 H.R. 4960, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
46 S. 1623, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
7 In fact, he must do so, for he is required to provide his employees with the option
of receiving covered services from a "Health Maintenance Organization" (HMO), a spe-
cial type of provider discussed later in the text.
1971]
HeinOnline  -- 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 19 1971-1972
The University of Chicago Law Review
collaborate in designing plans that will comply with the requirements
of the bill. Such encouragement to collusion, in an industry already
deficient in competitive energy, should be avoided.
With respect to the poor, the Bennett bill in essence incorporates the
Medicare controls, discussed previously in the context of the Long bill.
Some controls with respect to benefits provided the poor may be appro-
priate. The poor pay nothing and accordingly have no incentive to seek
out the cheapest providers; they lack a "proxy shopper" such as the em-
ployer in the other part of the program; and they may be poor shoppers,
especially for sophisticated services such as health care. For the reasons
stated earlier, however, the Medicare controls appear to be of doubtful
efficacy, and a better solution may be a combination of coinsurance and
provisions designed to increase the effectiveness of competition for
consumer patronage.
The Bennett bill authorizes the creation of "Health Maintenance
Organizations" (HMOs) empowered to contract with employers to
furnish the services required in the employer part of the bill and with
poor people to furnish the services to which the bill entitles them.48
HMOs bear a generic resemblance to prepaid group practice plans49-
which now have some eight million members in the United States-
under which the member pays a capitation fee for comprehensive health
services rather than fees for individual services and the physicians who
treat him are often salaried employees of the plan rather than indepen-
dent professionals. The HMO concept in the Bennett bill, however, is
broader than prepaid group practice. It is expressly provided that the
HMO can be a profit-making enterprise owned by complete outsiders
to the medical or other health professions and that it can delegate tradi-
tional physicians' functions to nonphysicians. These are two respects,
among others, in which group practice plans are currently inhibited
by state regulation. 0 The bill proscribes state regulatory impediments
to group practice, with one exception (advertising), discussed below.
The HMO concept is a promising if probably insufficient method of
expanding the supply of medical services to meet the new demands that
the Bennett bill would create. The factors limiting the supply of medi-
cal services appear to be primarily the scarcity of physicians, due largely
48 For a detailed study of this aspect of the Bennett bill, see Havighurst, supra note
28.
49 For background on prepaid group practice plans, see Note, The Role of Prepaid
Group Practice in Relieving the Medical Care Crisis, 84 HARv. L. REv. 887 (1971).
50 See AsPaN SYSTMS CoPoRATIoN, supra note 3; Note, supra note 49, at 960-75. For
example, in some states a group practice plan may not be implemented unless fifty per-
cent of the physicians of the area agree to join.
[39:1
HeinOnline  -- 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 20 1971-1972
National Health Insurance Plans
to the cost and length of training required by state law to become a
licensed physician, and secondarily the restrictions, also imposed by
state law, on the adoption of any method of organizing the provision of
health services other than on the basis of fees for individual services
rendered by self-employed physicians. The provisions of the Bennett
bill relating to HMOs deal, albeit indirectly and probably inadequately,
with the first problem (scarcity of physicians) by permitting functions
now performed exclusively by physicians to be delegated to nonphysi-
cians by the management of the HMO. It deals with the second problem
directly by permitting private entrepreneurial capital, not necessarily
furnished by members of the medical profession, to be invested in the
health care industry in forms of business enterprise now largely barred
as a consequence of state law.
Such an approach, limited though it is, has much to commend it.
It is not only likely to be more effective than direct controls of the
kind provided under Medicare, which can at best improve the alloca-
tion of existing medical resources and can do nothing to augment them,
but it is also cheaper since administrative costs are minimized. While
the bill could go further and liberate all providers of medical services
-not merely those qualifying as HMOs-from restrictive state regula-
tion, that step may be unnecessary. Unless qualification as an HMO
should prove difficult (it could be made easier, as will be discussed
next), successful formation and growth of HMOs would create great
pressure to unshackle other providers from legal restrictions that im-
paired their ability to compete with HMOs.
The HMO concept embodied in the Bennett bill could be improved,
however. First, although it is not altogether clear in this respect, the
bill appears to leave intact state regulations forbidding providers of
medical services to advertise, even if the provider is an HMO otherwise
immune from state regulation. This is a serious omission. Advertising
may be indispensable to a new firm fighting for the public's attention,
and there is no reason to think that the present context is exceptional
in this regard.
Second, the provisions of the bill governing the regulation of HMOs
by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare seem needlessly
elaborate and could discourage their formation. In order to be licensed
by the Secretary, an HMO must among other things demonstrate
"proof of financial responsibility and proof of capability to provide
comprehensive health care services, including institutional services,
efficiently, effectively, and economically."5 1 The italicized words inject
51 S. 1623, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 604(a)(4), 628(b)(4) (1971) (emphasis added).
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an- extremely vague and open-ended criterion-a potential source of
endless controversy, delay, and expense to the applicant. Worse, it is a
potential basis for refusing to license new HMOs that would compete
with existing licensees, an abuse to which licensing schemes are tradi-
tionally prone.
The criterion is unnecessary. HMOs that were not efficient, effective,
and economical would not obtain contracts with employers, and if they
failed in this respect they would not be able to enroll poor persons
either, because an HMO is required to have at least five thousand paid
enrollees before it may be reimbursed for serving the poor.5; This
requirement is designed, appropriately in the main,5 3 to prevent in-
efficient HMOs from establishing themselves in the market in which
consumer choice is likely to be least effective-the market for health
services for the poor. The requirement is reinforced by a further pro-
vision forbidding an HMO to retain a greater part of the proceeds from
treatingits poor enrollees than it retains from treating its paid enrollees.
The employer who contracts with an HMO is thus a "proxy shopper"
for any poor people who should happen to enroll with that HMO.
With all of this protection, it is not clear why a prospective HMO
should have to furnish any more proof of fitness than is required of an
applicant for an ordinary corporation charter.
Although the Bennett bill contains no provision for subsidization of
HMOs, the Administration apparently will seek legislation providing
such subsidies.5 4 This seems a mistake, however, since subsidization
would prevent a true market test of the viability of the HMO concept.
4. The Pell-Mondale Bill. The strategy of the Pell-Mondale bill"s
is broadly similar to that of the Bennett bill. There is no regulation of
the required employer plans, except, of course, a specification of mini-
mum benefits. There is a provision for the creation of entities com-
parable to, although significantly different from, HMOs: "Community
Health and Education Corporations" (CHECs). These are private,
profit-making corporations that are to provide comprehensive health
services on a prepaid basis (like group practice plans and HMOs) but
that are also required, to the extent feasible, to construct and maintain
52 Technically, an HMO must have a minimum of ten thousand members at least fifty
percent of whom are employed. S. 1623, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 628(b)(5) (1971). The re-
quirement may be waived upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. Id. §§ 628(h)-(i).
'53 One can quarrel with the ten thousand minimum, however; it might foster monopoly
in smaller communities. Perhaps HMOs with fewer members would not be viable, but
that is a judgment that can and should be left to the market.
54 See National Health Insurance Hearings, supra note 9, at 84-85 (testimony of HEW
Secretary Richardson).
55 S. 703, 924. Cqng. st. Sas. .(1971).
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hospitals and to conduct educational programs under university super-
vision. Eight of the fifteen directors of each CHEC are to be appointed
by the Secretary of HEW, the remaining seven to be elected by the
shareholders. Common stock may be issued in the first instance only to
states or their political subdivisions or to health care providers, al-
though apparently once issued it may be transferred without restriction.
Without going further, one discerns a serious weakness in the scheme
-overspecification likely to discourage the formation, limit the num-
ber, and reduce the efficiency of the CHECs. Nonprofit entities are
excluded. Large scale and diversification into hospital management
and medical education are encouraged despite the diseconomies of
scale and of underspecialization that might result. Entrepreneurship
is discouraged by limitations on who may be issued common stock,
by the government's control of the board of directors, and by the
inability of the common shareholders to elect more than one-third of
the directors. The purpose of these requirements is not obvious, and
their cumulative impact on the growth and efficiency of the CHEC
would surely be negative. The bill elsewhere provides for extensive
federal financial assistance to CHECs, a questionable feature that would
be unnecessary were the concept of the CHEC less rigid and therefore
less likely to fail in the market without federal aid.
The method by which such corporations are to be created is also
questionable. A CHEC may be formed only in areas where the Secre-
tary determines that one is needed. He is to base his determination of
need on seven factors. The problems they raise are illustrated by
the following three: "lack of reasonably priced comprehensive health
services within the area," "lack of health manpower resources needed
to provide health services within the area," and "the willingness of
existing providers of health services and health education" to contract
with and invest in the CHEC.56 The first two criteria quoted are
nebulous, extremely difficult to apply in practice, and seemingly dupli-
cative. The third criterion (the attitude of existing providers) invites a
veto by the local medical establishment in the very areas where CHECs
may be most needed. Since the criteria are not even consistent with one
another, the ultimate judgment of the Secretary would be largely an
arbitrary one and the opportunities for political manipulation there-
fore considerable.
The bill also provides for the regulation of providers of health ser-
vices affiliated with CHECs. A physician must be licensed not only by
a state but also by the Secretary of HEW. Once licensed by the Secre-
56 Id. J§ 302(b)(1)-(2). (4).
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tary, however, he may practice for a CHEC in any state. The Secretary
is also authorized to impose continuing-education and relicensing re-
quirements on physicians employed by CHECs. CHEC-run hospitals
are subject to a number of specific requirements as to standard of care
provided and, more important, to an essentially open-ended rule-making
power in the Secretary, who may impose such requirements as he "finds
necessary in the interest of the quality of the care and the safety of
patients in the institution."57 Other health professionals and facilities
affiliated with CHECs are similarly regulated. The intended or likely
impact of all this on the conditions underlying the inelasticity of the
supply of health care is obscure. The provision for national licensing
is obviously designed to enhance the geographical mobility of physi-
cians. Yet state licensure requirements are not in fact a serious obstacle
to physicians' relocating. s
Two additional features of the Pell-Mondale bill should be men-
tioned. First, the provisions for financial assistance to CHECs address
directly (in contrast to the Bennett bill) the problem of the undue time
and expense required under existing state licensure provisions to train
a physician-but perhaps not effectively. It seems odd to channel aid
to medical education to entities whose primary mission is to provide
comprehensive health care. More important, financial aid to medical
education is a slow and very costly method of augmenting the supply
of physicians.
Second, the bill provides for the creation of regional councils (whose
members are to be appointed by the Secretary of HEW) that are to
regulate the prices and dividends of CHECs and to review state health
facility construction plans contemplating federal financial assistance.
The earlier discussion of construction and price controls remains
applicable here. To be sure, the case for regulating the CHECs' prices
is strengthened by the fact that only one CHEC per community appears
to be contemplated and by the further fact that, by virtue of the exten-
sive federal assistance to which it would be entitled, the CHEC might
have a decisive advantage over any rival providers. In view of the
difficulties in subjecting the health care field to price regulation, a
57 Id. § 508(b)(9).
58 See Holen, Effects of Professional Licensing Arrangements on Interstate Labor
Mobility and Resource Allocation, 75 J. POL. ECON. 492 (1965). The author found that state
licensure requirements are a far greater barrier to interstate mobility of dentists and
lawyers than of doctors. The uneven distribution of physicians around the country is
explained, on grounds having nothing to do with state licensing laws, in Rimlinger &
Steele, An Economic Interpretation of the Spatial Distribution of Physicians in the U.S.,
30 S. ECON. J. 1 (1963).
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better solution would be eliminating the monopoly element and per-
mitting more than one CHEC to be formed in a community. But the
elephantine specifications for the CHEC are an obstacle here, for many
communities would not be able to sustain several entities engaged
simultaneously in providing comprehensive medical care, operating
hospitals, and furnishing medical training.
5. The Kennedy Bill. The Kennedy bill 9 provides for extensive
regulation of all covered services, and, since virtually all medical and
health services are covered, the entire health care field would be
brought under regulation. Like the Pell-Mondale bill, the Kennedy
bill provides for dual state-national licensing of physicians and for
open-ended control by the Secretary of HEW over health care in-
stitutions. Our discussion of such regulations in the context of the
Pell-Mondale bill is applicable here, but with an important further
consideration. The Pell-Mondale regulations are limited to physicians
employed and hospitals controlled by CHECs. Initially, at least, only
a small fraction of the nation's physicians and hospitals would be in-
volved. The parallel regulations in the Kennedy bill, in contrast, apply
to all physicians and hospitals rendering covered services-in effect, to
all the nation's physicians and hospitals. With every physician required
to be licensed twice, the already excessive period of time required to
become a practicing physician would be further prolonged. And the
national licensing standards might be set at a very high level. Com-
bined with the continuing-education and relicensing requirements in
the Kennedy bill (similar to those in the Pell-Mondale bill), national
licensing could result in an actual reduction in the number of physi-
cians and would at the very least erect new impediments to enlarging
their supply. Similarly, detailed controls over institutional providers,
apart from all their other costs and consequences, could, by raising
standards, diminish the supply of institutional health care.
The Kennedy bill also contemplates comprehensive federal regula-
tion of physicians' fees and hospital charges. The Health Security Board
(a new regulatory agency within HEW that would be responsible for
administering the plan) would first determine a total national health
budget for the coming year, based on total expenditures on health care
in the previous year but with important modifications to be discussed
in a moment. Out of the total budget, hospitals and other institutional
providers, excluding comprehensive health service organizations (akin
to HMOs, but again with differences to be elucidated shortly), would
be paid on the basis of cost estimates set forth in a prospective budget
59 S. 3, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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negotiated by each institution with the Board. The institution would
in effect be contracting to furnish services at an agreed rate that it could
not exceed even if its costs rose after the agreement was made. Compre-
hensive health service organizations and individual practitioners elect-
ing to be paid on a capitation basis would be paid an amount per
patient equal to the total budget for the region and type of service
involved divided by the number of people in the region receiving such
service. From the remainder of the budget, practitioners electing to be
paid on the traditional fee-for-service basis would be paid according to
a schedule of fees fixed by the Board.
The procedure may appear to allocate funds to physicians and hos-
pitals in a more or less automatic way on the basis of the previous year's
total expenditures on health care services, but the appearance is mis-
leading. The initial determination of the total budget indeed has a
crucial impact on the fee level but the determination is to a large degree
within the discretionary power of the Board. Among other things, the
Board can reduce the budget to reflect anticipated (hoped for?) reduc-
tions in the cost of health services and can reallocate funds among re-
gions of the country-regardless of the previous year's expenditures in
each region-in order to further the bill's expressed goal of reducing
regional differences in the real cost of health care. The regional realloca-
tions affect the capitation fee by increasing or decreasing the gross
amount of which the capitation fee is a fraction based on population.
The Board can also alter capitation fees on the basis of differences in
the amount of services rendered to particular population groups and
other relevant factors. The amount of the regional budget left over
after all capitation fees and hospital costs have been paid sets the upper
limit to the total payments that practitioners in the region, who charge
on a fee-for-service basis, can collect. The ceiling could be a low one.
And it is only a ceiling since actual payments to practitioners could be
much lower, depending on the fee schedule set by the Board.
The result, in sum, is that the Board would have considerable power
over the pricing of medical services, which it might use to restructure
the health care industry in accordance with political judgments or pres-
sures possibly contrary to the consumer interest in efficient health care.
The Board could easily discourage fee-for-service practice, regardless
of its merits, by fixing fees at a level so low that most physicians were
induced to switch to capitation fees or join comprehensive health service
organizations. It might be tempted to do so because of the statutory
commitment to the comprehensive health service organization and
capitation fee concepts and the possibility that without some coercion
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these concepts would not fare well against established patterns of sup-
plying medical services. Should the Board, instead of comprising advo-
cates of the concepts embodied in the Kennedy bill, be "captured" by
representatives of organized medicine, it could as easily destroy the
comprehensive health service organization and capitation fee concepts
by fixing capitation fees at an inadequate, and fees for individual medi-
cal services at a munificent, level. Either course would be possible, and
what is perhaps least likely is that the temptation to manipulate the
structure of the industry for essentially political ends would be success-
fully resisted.
Even if the pricing provisions of the bill were administered with the
sole aim of economizing on medical expenditures by preventing re-
imbursement for exorbitant charges, the administrative costs and dis-
incentive effects of price regulation could well exceed any beneficial
effects. It is unnecessary to repeat the previous discussion of the weak-
nesses of public utility regulation and the special considerations that
argue against its extension to the health care field. There are, to be
sure, some novel elements in the Kennedy bill's scheme of price regu-
lation: (1) the emphasis on prospective rather than retrospective cost-
ing, both in the total national budget and in the budgets for individual
institutional providers; (2) the need to determine demand as well as
cost in order to fix national and regional budgets; and (3) the use of
price control to alter regional patterns of supply. But these features
seem inordinately ambitious and likely to complicate far more than
they improve the regulatory effort. Estimation of future costs is even
more difficult than estimation of actual incurred costs. Measurement of
demand is very difficult also. And determination of a price that recon-
ciled the regional purposes of the bill with the goal of preventing
excessive charges would probably be impossible. The novel features of
the price control scheme may reflect awareness of the inappropriateness
of the public utility model, but the draftsmen have not articulated a
coherent and workable alternative.
It is just possible, however, that the price provisions in the Kennedy
bill have a somewhat different thrust from conventional monopoly
regulation. Much of the price increase brought about by Medicare, as
noted, has been the result not of waste or greed but of the fact that,
when demand rises without a corresponding increase in supply, price
will rise as a means of rationing the temporarily inadequate supply.
The benefits provisions of the Kennedy bill would have a similar effect
on demand. Ordinarily, when demand is temporarily excessive in rela-
tion to supply, a price rise is to be welcomed as a means of allocation
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superior to governmental fiat or queues. But the Kennedy bill pre-
cludes the use of price as a rationing device. The consumer of medical
services under the bill pays nothing, no matter how high the price of
the service rises. High prices caused by the new demands generated by
the bill would not moderate demand but would simply increase the
cost of the program to the government. Queues would form as con-
sumers jostled one another for access to the limited stock of health care
resources. In these circumstances there is an undoubted appeal in at-
tempting to prevent price from rising, and the scheme of price regula-
tion in the Kennedy bill, keyed as it is to expenditures for health care
in the previous year, may be intended to do just that. But there is much
to be said against such a scheme. Especially important in the present
context is the possibility that a temporary price rise could serve a
salutary purpose by attracting new venture capital into the health care
field, at least if existing restrictions on investment are removed, as they
are in the Bennett bill. And it may be possible to dampen the price
effects of a new spurt in demand for medical services, at lower social
cost, by working to expand the supply of medical services.
Like the Bennett and Pell-Mondale bills, the Kennedy bill contains
elements of "dynamic" regulation designed to augment the supply of
health care services. The comprehensive health service organization
of the Kennedy bill is generally similar to the Bennett bill's HMO.
The major difference is that the comprehensive health service orga-
nization may not be a profit-making entity.00 This is a substantial and
unwarranted limitation on the effectiveness of the device. It bars from
the health care field the private entrepreneur, who may have much to
contribute both in capital and in new ideas and methods for organizing
the provision of health care. Like the Pell-Mondale bill, the Kennedy
bill envisages substantial direct subsidies to medical education, plan-
ning, and other areas of perceived need in the health care field. If the
comprehensive health service organization were less restricted, the need
for additional subsidization to encourage the necessary expansion in
the supply of health care services might be felt less urgently.("
60 Also, as a technical drafting matter, the bill is less explicit in its preemption of in-
terfering state regulations than the Bennett bill.
61 I note in passing-properly explored, the subject would extend this paper un-
reasonably-that the Kennedy bill also contemplates comprehensive price regulation of
the prescription drug industry and of retail druggists. This typifies the overambitious
character of the bill. It also provides for extensive construction controls, authorizes the
government to require providers to provide additional services, and perpetuates the
Medicare bias in favor of the skilled nursing home.
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CONCLUSION
Of the pending bills, the Bennett bill seems the most promising from
a regulatory standpoint, at least if comprehensive benefits are intended
rather than the very limited benefits of the Long bill. Even the Bennett
bill, however, could be improved in a number of important details.
What is more important, the Bennett bill, despite many promising
features, does not really get to the root of the problem in the health
care field: the scarcity of physicians. Until that problem is solved, the
creation of new demands for health care, as under the Bennett bill, can
hardly avoid placing great upward pressure on prices.
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